Low Budget by Burchell, David
he’s supported the North American Free Trade 
Agreement—which would open up Mexico to 
American capital under conditions of low wages, 
no environmental protections, no safety protec­
tions and so on. This in turn would undermine all 
those standards here and result in massive loss of 
employment in the high wage industries. So there 
are contrad ictory elements in his platform. The real 
question isgoing to be the balance of political forces 
in the next few years; who’s going to be pushing him 
harder, and what forces are going to be operating in 
Congress. Moreover, Clinton’s going to be pursuing 
his agenda for industrial renewal under very diffi­
cult circumstances. The budget deficit is very large,
the national debt is extremely large, and it’s not 
going to be easy to to turn that around without 
raising taxes on working people—something which 
he has promised not to do and which, were he to do 
it, would be the end of him as a politician.
To his credit he has acknowledged that we face 
very deep problems and they are not going to be 
solved overnight. I don’t think anybody expects 
that he can do it very quickly but 1 do think that we 
are going to be in for a period of rising popular 
expectations and that that does create a lot of 
pressure to make changes more rapidly than he 
might otherwise be inclined to do. ■
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In the election campaign Bill Clinton pro­
duced a fairly comprehensive industrial and eco­
nomic plan for the new administration. How do 
you assess that plan, and what chance of success 
do you think it has?
I think if they’re able to implement their indus­
trial strategy, virtually all of it is worthwhile. I also 
think the bulk of it is relatively uncontroversial. US 
investment in material infrastructure from about 
1948 until the late 1970s was about 2 per cent of 
GDP, but that fell by about a half during the 80s. So 
we’ve really been starved of infrastructure in the 
1980s. The mainstream of the economics profes­
sion and many other observers believe that signifi­
cant increases in infrastructure investment are en­
tirely appropriate given historical norms in the US. 
And everyone believes that sort of investment will 
have long-term economic payoffs. So there’s no 
great controversy there.
On education and training it's widely agreed we 
need to make substantial improvements in the
stock of human capital in the US. The present 
system of education has bad effects on inequality. 
Again, everyone agrees we need to substantially 
increase the capitalisation of American industry, 
and that present rates of business investment in 
plant and new equipment are historically quite low. 
So the investment tax credit that Bill Clinton has 
proposed is not a particularly controversial item. 
Nor are the manufacturing extension services or 
advanced technology centres—everybody wants to 
get better and newer equipment into the economy 
faster, and to diffuse its use among small and me­
dium-sized firms, as well as larger industry leaders.
Where controversy begins is with more deliber­
ate efforts to string firms together, to pick winners 
and losers—in other words to do something other 
than facilitate the provision of broad public goods 
or increased access to them. Here Clinton’s advisors 
are very cautious and, given the experience of other 
countries, maybe properly so. They are interested in 
supporting basic research in different ways—creat­
ing a civilian equivalent of the defence research 
and development agency, for instance, and creating 
industry consortia for research on generic technolo­
gies, like batteries for electronic cars. But they’re 
not going to pick winners and losers in the way that 
those hostile to industrial policy have characterised 
the process.
The problem is one of magnitude. We have an 
approximately $6 trillion economy, with an ap­
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proximately $290billion deficit at the moment. Bill 
Clinton is proposing additional expenditure of $20 
billion a year on infrastructure. The idea of that $20 
billion making a significant impact on employment 
is therefore somewhat remote. Most growth projec­
tions for next year are about 2.5 percent. When you 
have growth at that level you get increased revenue 
from tax receipts, and that will bring the deficit 
down at the rate of around $ 20 billion a year. But in 
order to get a really substantial deficit reduction 
through growth alone, you’ve got to be at much 
higher levels—around 4 or 5 per cent. So the 
question becomes, can you get to that level of 
growth by spending an additional $20 billion ?No- 
body thinks that you can.
You could conceive of a program which would 
stay within the budget constraints, if Clinton made 
much deeper cuts in military spending than he 
seems ready to contemplate at the moment—if you 
freed up say $50-80 billion a year from defence cuts, 
that really would have a significant effect. And I 
think they’ll be more prepared to cut defence the 
more successful they are in their short-term pro­
gram.
Nearly all the things you’ve mentioned are 
things that the Australian governments made 
their priority in the 80s. And a lot of the short­
comings you’ve mentioned are precisely the same 
shortcomings we experienced. They have, for 
instance, been criticised for placing an overem­
phasis on training, without—so it’s argued— 
creating appropriate jobs for trainees to take their 
training to.
There are two parts to that problem. The first is 
the general problem of job creation; the other is 
pushing the structure of existing jobs up the human 
capital ladder in such a way that you’re not just 
creating jobs for ditch-diggers, but generating jobs 
for skilled engineers or skilled blue-collar workers, 
or whatever. And both of those involve interven­
tions that I think the new administration will be 
reluctant to make.
The easy way to create the necessary jobs is to 
spend a lot of money, and really heat up the 
economy—but the existence of the deficit makes 
that unlikely. Clinton’s advisors are already ex­
tremely skittish about financial markets and long­
term Treasury rates. The other problem—that is, 
increasing the value content of jobs in firms—is 
constrained by the absence of the microeconomic 
mechanisms to force change at the plant level. You 
don’t get significant industrial upgrading through a 
movement to so-called high-performance work or­
ganisation unless you have some pressure inside 
firms for it. A lot of firms will make no more extra 
money by upgrading than they can by deskilling 
work and sweating labour. And the only way to get 
beyond that is to build a significant floor to wages 
and to get some sort of disciplined force inside the 
firm that is effectively forcing upgrading.
One way of doing that is through a revived 
labour movement—but that doesn’t seem to be on 
the horizon. Another way is to introduce govern­
ment mandates of various sorts in terms of purchas­
ing contracts—requiring firms to meet certain qual­
ity standards or environmental controls. The 
Clinton-Gore plan has a little bit of all those things: 
they do favour increasing environmental require­
ments; they will increase the minimum wage; they’ve 
talked about government purchasing a bit. But the 
crux of the matter is getting some kind of pressure 
inside the firms themselves, and in general we don’t 
have that in the US.
You mentioned that there’s a certain amount 
of scepticism in the Clinton ranks about the 
‘picking winners’ approach, and that’s a scepti­
cism that’s obviously not totally without founda­
tion. But in Australia and elsewhere there’s been 
some movement in the industry policy debate 
towards different models which rely less on pick­
ing winners and more upon a different role for the 
state, which is less directive and more facilitative.
The Clinton camp certainly talk the language 
of a facilitative state, as opposed to a command and 
control state. However, Idon’tthinkthey’vethought 
very carefully about how to encourage the appropri­
ate institutional basis in the private economy. My 
impression is that they haven’t been looking at the 
interventionist policies used in, for example, Italy 
or Denmark, although there are lots of people in the 
Clinton administration who are well aware of those 
examples.
At present there is an incredible degree of 
uncertainty about just where the new administra­
tion will place their bets. However, I cannot imag­
ine the kind of industrial policy you’ve outlined 
being a major focus of policy. I think their major 
focus will be on basic infrastructure expenditure on 
one side, and education and training on the other. 
They may be open to alternative forms of worker 
representation, which would be a welcome step 
towards some of the forms of institutional infra­
structure that you would need. But so far they’re not 
talking of aconcerted policy to develop networks of 
firms or a regionally-based economic policy. Those 
kinds of initiatives, if they happen, will happen in 
the shadow of national policy. There are in fact 
several different state experiments—but at present 
it’s being pursued on a piecemeal basis.
You and COWS have been involved in work 
around industrial regeneration at a regional level. 
What sort of lessons would you draw from your 
experience as to the possibilities and pitfalls, given 
the American environment, in trying to general­
ise those experiences?
The general lesson I would draw is that it 
involves a lot of time. It involves a slow ‘low 
politics’ of building trust among people who hate 
each otherand getting co-ordination amongpeople 
who are really not used to co-ordinating at all. No
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matter how much you read it in a book, it’s hard to 
appreciate existentially, I think, how liberal a soci­
ety America is, how highly fragmented. We don’t 
have anything like the level of associative action 
you have among labour and capital even in Aus­
tralia. We have an incredibly decentralised labour 
movement, which covers a very modest fraction of 
the workforce. And employers are, by and large, 
very weakly grouped. If you want to get serious 
concertation of interests in regional economies, 
you need to have some structures of co-ordination 
both among and between firms and unions. And 
then—given the extraordinarily low rates of un­
ionisation in the US— you need to build links 
between those parties and the non-unionised 
workforce. At present thosejrnks are simply not 
there.
In Milwaukee 
we were able to 
create such 
structures after 
long negotiation 
and deliberation.
vanced human capital that it has as a result of this 
training. I don’t want to exaggerate in any way what 
we’ve done—it’s very promising, it’s extremely ad­
vanced, relative to national practice in the US, but 
it’s still extremely modest and tentative.
Given those obstacles, how do you think the 
kind of process that you’ve gone through in
program
Milwaukee could be 
on a federal level? Is it 
that is simply beyond a 
administration given in 
inadequacies in 
America?
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be one of 
the most 
advanced, 
and certainly 
the largest, of such 
labour/capital part­
nerships in the US. 
But the very fact of its 
^novelty tells you something 
of the problem. And the co­
-ordination that we’ve achieved 
so far has been the relatively easy 
part. We’ve been able to get firms 
and unions to agree to talk about 
common credentialling systems, a re­
ordering of their internal labour markets, 
and the provision of training in those 
markets. But we have not, by and large, gotten 
to the hard issue of what obligations follow from 
people getting increased training.
We’re not at the point of, say, the German 
system which requires that once you get increased 
training you have to get paid more for a certain 
period of time—a system which concentrates em­
ployers’ minds on better exploiting the more ad­
federal training 
right now is some 
thing called the Job 
Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA), which allocates 
something in the order of $4 
billion per year for the training of 
isplaced workers. Clinton advisors are 
talking about substantially increasing 
that amount of money. But the JTPA is 
administered locally through what are called 
Private Industry Councils (PICs). And these 
ICs are, by law, dominated by business. Labour 
enjoys very modest de facto representation, perhaps 
one person on a 20-member PIC. The experience 
with PICS has been, by common consensus, ex­
tremely unhappy. They are given to all manner of 
corruption and inefficiency, they are not well staffed, 
and it’s not clear why they spend the money at their 
disposal in the way they do.
Second, there is an incredible number of federal 
training programs—approximately 130or 135 sepa­
rate programs. These programs are a real nightmare 
for consumers of the services, and indeed for many 
state training providers, because the rules by which 
they are required to spend their money often con­
flict. Each state has a multitude of different pots of 
cash, usually distributed between very different 
agencies which are not properly co-ordinated with 
one another. Its bare description is the province of 
experts, let alone its effective navigation.
But if you put those two problems together, a 
possibility suggests itself. One could devise rela­
tively comprehensive labour market boards, de­
fined in terms of the regional labour markets, which 
could assume significant responsibility in a revamped 
and streamlined national training system. This would 
amass quite a large pot of money—large enough I 
think, toexcite employers to want toget their hands 
on it. And if you had that level of interest you would 
be able to impose various conditions on them get­
ting theirhands on it. For example: they might have 
to demonstrate that they were representative of the 
communities from which they came, and they would 
have to include representatives of business, labour,
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public training providers and so on.
So, you would say to a reasonably savvy em­
ployer in the US: how would you like to have 
training simplified, and administered by a regional 
labour market board, which would have a general 
mandate to promote industrial upgrading in your 
region? However, as a condition of giving you 
training we want you to submit to a full-scale 
evaluation of your operation, we want to talk to you 
about how you might upgrade it, and so on—this 
approach has been tried with considerable success 
in at least a few states in the US. That is at least a 
plausible scenario. It wouldn’t be a radical reform 
and would have, I think, rather substantial support 
from the key players, including the business com­
munity. It would be opposed by some bureaucrats 
and lobbyists from the existing training structure— 
but it’s always easy for a government to go to war on 
one of its own bureaucracies.
If that model worked, all manner of things 
would become possible. The boards could set atone 
for industrial policy on a regional basis; they could 
in turn be closely co-oidinated with the 170 or so 
manufacturing technology sectors that Clinton is 
interested in creating. I don’t know if the new 
administration will have the wit to do that, or the 
political will to stand up to the bureaucrats. But I 
think it’s certainly plausible.
You’ve also been working on a book on asso­
ciative democracy and democratic governance. 
How do you see associative practice as contribut­
ing to this sort of model of industrial regeneration?
There are lots of problems where the answer to 
the question ‘should we give this to the state or 
should we give it to the market?’ is a double nega­
tive. This is where associative forms may be appro­
priate. By ‘associations’ I mean non-firm,non-state 
and non-political party organisations— 
employerassociations or trade unions or commu­
nity organisations.
The re are lots of areas where enforcement mecha­
nisms and information services can be provided 
through voluntary associations more plausibly than 
through either private markets or public hierar­
chies. Again, given inequalities in access to infor­
mation and resources, the pattern of associative 
action which arises ‘naturally’ under advanced or 
non-advanced capitalism is inadequate. And a lot 
of the organic solidarities that might have weighed 
against that distorted pattern of associations in the 
past—trade unions for example—are fast eroding. 
For those reasons, if you want an associative order 
which can complement the state and other institu­
tions, you’re going to have to have a deliberate 
politics of association. You’re going to have to 
supplement nature with artifice. Otherwise, you’re 
basically condemning yourself to a world with a 
choice only between states and markets, and you’re 
going to condemn yourself to an associative order 
which is in many ways quite destructive of demo­
cratic norms.
In Australia in the 80s there was something of 
a revolution ir t̂he union movement over some of 
these issues. Unions found they had to become 
involved in a far wider range of industrial and 
workplace issues than ever before. How do you 
see the role of US trade unions in this process?
American labour is not very advanced on a lot 
of this stuff. Labour in the US does not have a 
particularly well-developed vision of how it should 
insert itself constructively into industrial upgrad­
ing. The typical union president, or member of a 
union local, has never heard of most of the terms 
we’ve been talking about. They would certainly 
never have heard about the high-performance work 
organisation, industrial upgrading and so on. And 
it’s not only a difference of language, it’s also a basic 
difference in the conception of what a trade union 
movement can do. These people have been kicked 
around for so long. They’ve been subjected to an 
unending assault in the 1980s, and they’ve had to 
fight just to staunch the flow of members out of the 
movement. They just don’t have any time to think 
about this stuff. And that means that on the labour 
side of things, there’s no alternative plan for eco­
nomic development. That’s a problem. If you set up 
a labour market board you’ve got to have union 
people and business people involved together. For 
that to be real there has to be some real debate—but 
the unions don’t yet have the capacity to have that 
debate.
In four years time, when Bill Clinton runs for 
president again, what would you be happy with 
seeing achieved in the area of industrial 
policy?
If they actually establish the manufacturing 
centres I mentioned at the begining, and have 
provided them with institutional linkage to local 
labour market boards, that would be a fabulous 
advance at the local and regional level. That by 
itself would make me quite happy. Again, if they 
can really open up higher education in a significant 
way to poorer sections of the population, that 
obviously would be a huge egalitarian gain. I am 
frankly sceptical of the ability of youth apprentice­
ships to change the skills base of the workforce: 
you’ve really got to change the practices of firms if 
you’re going to train kids adequately on the job. But 
if they get something going in that area, that would 
be great. I have very low expectations, so I’ll be 
easily satisfied. ®
DAVID BURCHELL is ALR’s editor. Febru­
ary’s ALR will continue our series on the new 
direction in US policy: we interview Charles 
Sabel, co-author of The Second Industrial Divide 
and originator of the debate around ‘flexible spe­
cialisation’.
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